Elysian Shadows

http://www.ted.com/talks/sam_harris_sci ... right.html

This video attempts to take on the claim that you can't get an "ought" from an "is". (in other words, you can't derive how you should behave based on plain, non-prescriptive facts about the universe.) It's funny because I completely disagree with so much of his reasoning but I definitely agree with the conclusion.

Harris essentially makes an unfounded assertion, doing the same thing that theists do when they confuse universality with absoluteness. That is, "we all feel a certain way morally about X, therefore X must be an absolute moral truth."

But I've always argued against the "ought"/"is" problem also. The problem is that, implicit in the claim "You can't get an 'ought' from an 'is'" is that there exists an absolute "ought". The premise is flawed to begin with. You can't get an "ought" of this sort from anything because the entire concept is nonsensical. What you can get, however, is the type of ought that does exist: an "ought-for" or "ought-if". That is, given some end/value, you can at least theoretically use science and reason to derive the best way to achieve it. Similarly, you can use science/reason to determine what it is that we value, by and large. Clearly we won't all value the same things, but given our extremely similar biology and the influences which shaped it, we agree much more than we disagree. And additionally, science and reason can serve to filter our moral behaviors that don't have any ground to stand on in the first place, e.g. "turn your pillowcase opening away from your bed so the evil spirits will pour off to the side." (This is not a joke; this is an actual superstition practiced and feared by the very religious mother of someone I know, who also panics during any thunderstorm, honestly fearing it may be the Rapture.)

Easy there, tiger.

Harris never once says anything about there being an absolute moral truth. And when he begins with the idea of humans feeling a certain way about something, it is only to point out the fact that the connection between morals and human values is that of changes in consciousness. This is what we as humans are most concerned with. From that we can assess what actions will cause what changes in consciousness, and be able to decide what actions will result in the greatest human flourishing.

Notice still that this is not absolute. It is objective. And it can change over time, as Harris discusses with the example of the statue, and physical health.

vargonian wrote:You can't get an "ought" of this sort from anything because the entire concept is nonsensical. What you can get, however, is the type of ought that does exist: an "ought-for" or "ought-if". That is, given some end/value, you can at least theoretically use science and reason to derive the best way to achieve it.

This is either complete semantics, or you missed the first section of the talk entirely. One of the reasons morals can never be called absolute is because they are simply based on the human values of changes in the quality of life of conscious beings - which can change over time, and is, of course, to a degree, subjective. So it is assumed that the "if" you are referring to here would be "to cause the highest quality of life for conscious beings". Harris never makes the claim that we ought do something period, and even stresses this point in his chess example, that even with objective rules, there are exceptions. Using the chess example, you're basically saying that no rules in chess can be followed since we haven't established that these rules are to be followed if you want to win the game.

vargonian wrote:Similarly, you can use science/reason to determine what it is that we value, by and large.

No, the most you can do are studies of what humans tend to value, and this is what was discussed in the beginning. From that, however, we can use science/reason to establish the best actions to take to follow these values - and that is what Harris was discussing.

vargonian wrote:Harris essentially makes an unfounded assertion, doing the same thing that theists do when they confuse universality with absoluteness. That is, "we all feel a certain way morally about X, therefore X must be an absolute moral truth."

I may be wrong here (I only saw the video once), but he did talk about a continuum and that there could be many working truths. I think this speaks more to an "ought-for" as you described it. Ideally it seems like he wants to find a golden mean, but I feel like he acknowledges that may be impossible given people have physical/chemical differences. I completely agree with him that if someone is ignorant on how they are affecting the conscious experience, they cannot consciously make a morally wise decision. (i.e. suicide bombers ending their lives to have a theoretical orgy with 72 virgins)

I just read what aamesxdavid wrote, and that's more along the lines of how I interpreted Harris' talk.

Well, I hope that I simply misinterpreted that part of what Harris is saying, because I agree with the overall theme: that science can and does inform our moral choices, and even our moral values (i.e. why we value the things we do). I will have to rewatch the video, but when I heard him talking about "affecting consciousness", he seemed to be applying that standard and implying that somehow it's "the" standard, which in retrospect I may have made a false assumption about. Instead, he may have just been saying that it's something "we all pretty much agree with, therefore it's a good basis", which is great, and that's how I feel as well.

Edit: Rewatching, it seems I'm getting hung up by his absolute-sounding language, for example: "It is possible for individuals, and even whole cultures, to care about the wrong things; which is to say it's possible for them to have beliefs and desires that reliably lead to needless human suffering." It seems here that he's implying that "needless human suffering" is somehow objectively "wrong". Of course I think it's wrong too but I realize that it's my subjective (albeit extremely common) opinion. In any case it's a minor nitpick.

Also implicit in his entire argument seems to be the assumption that the utilitarian form of morality is the ideal, i.e. what's best for most of us overall is the way we should go. I actually agree with this; I just get hung up on the way he makes it sound, at least to me, like an objective fact.

It's funny when people (not Harris) say things like "science can tell us how things came to be, but it can't tell us why they came to be." That's like saying: "Science can tell us what the Earth is made of, but it can't tell us what it's feeling."

vargonian wrote:It's funny when people (not Harris) say things like "science can tell us how things came to be, but it can't tell us why they came to be." That's like saying: "Science can tell us what the Earth is made of, but it can't tell us what it's feeling."

I completely agree. Very few things are more frustrating than the naive assumption that there is any intrinsic value to things, and/or that they have some sort of objective inherent purpose.

aamesxdavid wrote:

vargonian wrote:It's funny when people (not Harris) say things like "science can tell us how things came to be, but it can't tell us why they came to be." That's like saying: "Science can tell us what the Earth is made of, but it can't tell us what it's feeling."

I completely agree. Very few things are more frustrating than the naive assumption that there is any intrinsic value to things, and/or that they have some sort of objective inherent purpose.

You mean like, a vagina and a penis? Some things i'm my opinion have a very clear purpose, altho i don't know if you can use the purpose to justify uses, or more pertinently "un-justify" uses.

(sorry, thats not completely germane, but thought id chuck that in there.)

avansc wrote:

aamesxdavid wrote: I completely agree. Very few things are more frustrating than the naive assumption that there is any intrinsic value to things, and/or that they have some sort of objective inherent purpose.

You mean like, a vagina and a penis? Some things i'm my opinion have a very clear purpose, altho i don't know if you can use the purpose to justify uses, or more pertinently "un-justify" uses.

(sorry, thats not completely germane, but thought id chuck that in there.)

Well, we're not talking about "purpose" as in "it can be / is used for a function", but rather some sort of imperative, e.g. "the right way to use a penis is for the dual purpose of procreation and waste disposal." There's no objective or absolute moral imperative that we use our penises to these ends, but we just evolved to, and for the most part we're naturally inclined to do so. But just because we evolved that way, it doesn't imply that it's somehow right or wrong to behave in accordance with that (though I wouldn't recommend going against nature as far as your bladder is concerned ).